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The Role of Remorse in Criminal Justice 
Christopher Bennett 
 
In Oxford Handbooks Online (Criminology and Criminal Justice), New York: Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming. 
ABSTRACT 
In this essay I review the role that remorse does and ought to play in criminal 
justice. Evidence of remorse appears to influence decision-making in a number of 
stages of the criminal process. But should it? I explain how remorse might have 
an appropriate role given certain assumptions about the general justifying aim of 
criminal justice. I also look at the nature of remorse as an emotion, and how 
differing conceptions of the emotions can inform our understanding of the role 
remorse might play. However, I also look at some serious challenges that face 
any proposal to give criminal justice officials powers to evaluate remorsefulness 
and to treat offenders differently on their basis. I conclude that it may be that the 
best we can do is to attempt to design a system that acknowledges the 
appropriateness of remorse but does not disadvantage those who are unable to 
display it to the satisfaction of a designated official.  
KEYWORDS: REMORSE; CRIMINAL JUSTICE; SENTENCING; MITIGATION; 
EMOTION; PUNISHMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
Edward Hyde  - ǯǮǯȂ is an iconic figure of evil in modern Western literature. His 
depiction tells us something important about the role of remorse in the moral 
consciousness of its intended audience. Stevenson first reveals the horror of ǯǡǤǡ
place late one night: 
 Ǯǡǣ
eastward at a good walk, and the other a girl of maybe eight or ten who 
was running as hard as she was able down a cross street. Well, sir, the two 
ran into one another naturally enough at the corner; and then came the 
horrible part of the thing; for the man trampled calǯ
body and left her screaming on the ground. It sounds like nothing to hear, ǤǯǢ
Juggernaut. I gave a view halloa, took to my heels, collared my gentleman, 
and brought him back to where there was already quite a group about the 
screaming child. He was perfectly cool and made no resistance, but gave ǡǯ
(Stevenson 1950 [1886], pp. 336-7) 
 
This incident, being the first description of Hyde, is clearly meant to shock. As it 
turns out, however, the child is not badly hurt. The shocking thing is meant to be 
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Hyde himself, his actions and reactions, and the insight they give into the 
emptiness, even unintelligibility, Ǥǯǡ
view of the story, lies in the fact that he lacks all fellow-feeling. The child means Ǥǯǡǡǯ
to have taken any steps to avoid knocǤǯ
before the event, moreover, is mirrored by his cool attitude after the event. Just ǯǡǯm that he has caused the child 
harm. The screaming that would Ȃ the narrative implies Ȃ touch the heart of any 
decent human being seems not to register with Hyde. Furthermore, the utter ǯested in 
his body, his demeanor and his gestures, so that his evil is there for all to see, to 
wonder at and be repelled by. 
 
I begin with this excerpt in order to fix some ideas about the place of remorse in 
our social and moral life, and to raise some questions that we will investigate in 
what follows. We should not take literary sources as infallible guides to moral 
standards, of course. Nevertheless, as with marketing, stories like this one play 
on firm expectations of their readers, and one can use highly successful stories to 
see what those expectations are, and hence learn something about the readers to Ǥ	ǡǯ
connection between perceptions of wrongdoing and judgments regarding the 
suitability of remorse on the other. It is a deep feature of the moral life that we 
expect someone who realizes that they have done wrongfully harmed another 
person, and to whom it matters that they have done so, to feel remorse. Indeed a 
lack of remorse is taken to show a lack of care about other people altogether, as 
though one cannot have a sense of the importance of other people and yet harm ȋǡǡǮǯȌǤǡ
remorse can provoke even greater anger (or revulsion, frustration, 
incomprehension) towards the apparent wrongdoer than the commission of the 
wrong itself. A person who has committed some wrong can compound it by 
failing to experience appropriate remorse. Thirdly, we expect remorse to make ǡǯ
can see and understand. Remorse should appear on the body, and it is part of ǯǤ 
 
What has all this to do with criminal justice? Remorse matters insofar as criminal 
justice takes an interest in the attitudes that defendants and convicted offenders 
have towards those whom the criminal justice system is Ȃ at least on the face of it Ȃ designed to protect and serve. As we will see in the next section, it looks as 
though criminal justice does have such an interest Ȃ although whether it should, 
and the precise character of its interest, will depend on various issues that we 
will pursue throughout the rest of the essay. In the sections to follow we will ask 
how remorse fits in to various conceptions of the general justifying aim of 
criminal justice (section 3); what kind of emotion remorse is, and what 
difference that makes to its relevance to criminal justice (section 4); and whether 
there are further moral and practical reasons not to have criminal justice officials ǯ
(section 5). 
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2. Six Roles For Remorse In Criminal Justice 
It is almost certain that large numbers of criminal acts go unreported, and hence 
never lead to action at any level of the criminal justice system (Coleman and 
Moynihan 1996); it would be a plausible though hard-to-confirm hypothesis that 
prompt and convincing displays of remorse on the part of perpetrators account 
for at least some victims deciding not to report what has been done to them and 
have it labeled as a crime. This would be a further role for remorse in addition to 
the roles to be considered in this section. We might call it a potentially pre-
emptive role for remorse in criminal justice. But once an action is designated 
potentially criminal and an investigation begins, there are at least six places in 
which remorse can play a role in criminal justice.  
 
First of all, there is the relevance of a capacity of remorse to determinations of 
whether a person is criminally responsible. Lack of such a capacity is often 
thought to be a feature of psychopathy (Hare 1996). While standards of criminal 
responsibility do not currently tend to include an explicit exemption based on 
psychopathy (the Model Penal Code specifically rules it out: Sec. 4.01(2)), the 
basis for criminal responsibility is widely taken to be rationality, or an ability to 
be guided by reasons; and because the reasons in question in criminal law are 
moral reasons, there is a live debate about whether a psychopath, lacking a 
capacity for remorse, thereby lacks a capacity to be guided by moral reasons, and 
hence should be excluded from criminal responsibility (Murphy 1972; Duff 1986; 
Garvey 2008).   
 
Secondly, remorse can play a role at trial, for instance, in swaying a jury to 
convict on a lesser offence in a case where the defendant admits causing serious 
harm or fatality. Say the defendant admits causing death negligently or 
recklessly, but pleads not guilty to a charge of murder on the grounds that the 
action was unintentional. If the defendant shows remorse in the witness box, the 
plea may appear more convincing. One who appears remorseless, untroubled by 
the fact that they have been a cause of death, may give judge or jury the 
impression that he or she could well have done it intentionally; whereas 
someone who is clearly troubled by remorse may thereby give evidence of 
strong psychological barriers against intentionally taking life. This was arguably 
a feature in the 2014 trial in South Africa of Oscar Pistorius, the Olympic athlete 
who shot his wife Reeva Steenkamp in the bathroom of their home in the middle 
of the night, claiming he suspected her of beiǤǯ
in the courtroom as evidence was being presented, and his apparently 
remorseful performance on the witness stand, were relentlessly analyzed as 
evidence of whether he was guilty of premeditation. Because of the absence of 
reporting restrictions in South African trials, this became an international 
conversation, as Pistorius was surely aware it would (Surette 2015). 
 
Thirdly, remorse can play a role as a mitigating factor at sentencing (Bandes 
2016; Maslen 2015). For instance, the United States Sentencing Commission 
ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǯǮǤǯǯ
the crime is taken as a consideration potentially warranting a decrease in the 
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sentence that would otherwise be given. Although remorse is not mentioned 
explicitly in this section of the Guidelines, it does appear to play a central 
unspoken role. To see this, notice that this section contains the provision that: Ǯǯ
acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing Ǥǯǡ
one on the face of it, since the features that are explicitly mentioned as forms of 
acceptance of responsibility Ȃ ǡǮvoluntary termination or withdrawal 
from criminal conduct or associationsǯǢ Ǯvoluntary payment of restitution prior to 
adjudication of guiltǯǢ Ǯvoluntary surrender to authorities promptly after 
commission of the offenseǯǢ Ǯvoluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of 
the fruits and instrumentalities of the offenseǯ; and Ǯpost-offense rehabilitative 
efforts (e.g., counseling or drug treatment)ǯ Ȃ are all publicly verifiable features 
that the sentencing judge is in no special position to determine. Hence the view 
that the sentencing judge is in a special position seems rather to reflect the 
assumption that an important evidential ground for determining whether or not 
the defendant accepts responsibility consists in behavior that the judge is in a 
privileged position to observe and assess, namely, his or her behavior and 
demeanor at the trial and in post-trial meetings, and specifically whether that 
behavior is such as to show remorse. In the U.S., the role of remorse in 
sentencing decisions takes on a particularly urgent cast in relation to capital 
cases where a jury is appointed to make the decision whether the death sentence 
should be deployed. Jurors who decide in favor of the death penalty cite lack of 
remorse as the most compelling reason for doing so (Sundby 1997-8). And ǯ
their closing arguments (Costanza and Peterson 1994). 
 
Fourthly, remorse can be implicated in rehabilitative sentences that require the 
offender to undertake a program to confront and address the causes of their 
offending behavior. For instance, the U.K. Criminal Justice Act (2003) introduced ǮǡǯǣǮǯǡ-management ǡǢǮǯǢǮǯǤǮǯǡ
be judged by an appropriate official as having successfully completed them, it is 
hard to see how such a judgment could be made if the official does not at the 
same time judge that the offender has taken responsibility for his or her previous 
action, and now sees them as objects of painful remorse that they must work not 
to repeat.  
 
Fifthly, remorse can play a role in parole decisions, when a board is deciding 
whether to allow early release or otherwise ameliorate the terms of the 
sentence. Parole boards tend to have assessment of the risks offenders pose to 
the public as their official rationale. However, in reality such assessments often 
hinge on whether or not the offender displays remorse. This can throw up 
problems. Commenting on the notorious U. K. case of convicted killers of black 
teenager Stephen Lawrence Ȃ in which one of the convicted men had told the 
 5 
ǣǮǤǯȂ  
Harry Fletcher, leader of the union of probation officers, said:  
 ǮMy experience is that a continued claim of innocence is always a barrier. 
A lifer, in order to get out of jail on licence, needs to demonstrate that he 
or she has shown remorse, completed rehabilitation programmes and is 
therefore low-risk. By definition, if the prisoner says they have not 
committed the crime, they are not able to tick the relevant boxes for Ǥǯȋard 2012)  
 
Sixthly, and perhaps more abstractly, remorse might be said, not just to play a 
role in particular decision-making stages of the criminal process, but to have a 
structuring role in the criminal justice system as a whole (Duff 1986, 2001). To 
put it more precisely, we might say that perceptions of the appropriateness of 
remorse Ȃ ǮǯǯǮǯȂ helps to explain, not just some of the official 
rhetoric about criminal justice, but also some of the rituals according to which 
criminal justice is structured. Criminal justice is not simply an efficient 
technocratic method of social control or social hygiene. Rather it centers around 
what would otherwise appear to be the clunky and archaic forum of the trial, 
where a defendant is asked to appear before his or her peers (or the judicial 
representatives thereof), and to answer a charge. The very form of this forum 
suggests a public interrogation, but also an opportunity for the convicted 
defendant to be told in no uncertain terms of the moral attitudes that are 
appropriate for his or her situation, and to be given the chance to display them. ǡǮǯǯ
in what in some places is still non-ǮǤǯ
structure of the criminal process, from the temptation that leads to crime, 
through the investigation, the arraignment, the condemnation from the judge, to 
the time for reflection and repentance in prison, until eventual release, reformed 
back into the community, captures a narrative of transgression, alienation, 
confrontation and reconciliation that lies deep in our moral psychology (and 
which is captured neatly by Dostoevsky in the structure of Crime and 
Punishment). The criminal justice system, on this view, is a complex system with 
numerous official goals. But the fact that states pursue those goals specifically 
through a criminal justice framework Ȃ and the presence of a criminal as well as 
a civil process for dealing with socially unacceptable behavior Ȃ strongly 
suggests a historical connection with wider social conceptions of the ǮǯǤ 
 
This list of six roles that remorse plays within criminal justice could be expanded Ȃ for instance, if we were to take into account the role it plays alternatives to 
conventional criminal justice such as restorative justice, as we touch on below. 
However, a number of authors have challenged whether remorse should play a 
significant role. It is to this question we turn now.  
 
3. The Place Of Remorse In The Philosophy Of Criminal Justice 
The discussion so far has been descriptive, offering an account of how 
perceptions and determinatǯ
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passage through the criminal process. However, the criminal justice system is 
not simply something that happens to us; it is a human creation, one that in 
principle we sustain and direct on the basis that it reflects judgments that we 
endorse. Of course, it would be naïve to think that the criminal justice system we 
have at the moment reflects our values perfectly; it would be similarly naïve to 
think that we can reform something as large and complex as our criminal justice ǡǯ
values. But criminal justice has a huge effect on individuals and communities, ǯ
does is acceptable simply by pointing to the complexity of reform. On this basis 
we turn from the descriptive to the normative and ask whether the criminal 
justice system is right to give remorse the roles that it does. 
 
If remorse is to play a role in an institution like criminal justice, it might seem a 
natural implication that it will need to give officials1 within that system 
responsibility for making evaluations of remorsefulness Ȃ that is, whether 
defendants or convicted offenders are experiencing remorse that is appropriate 
in its depth, adequacy, and sincerity Ȃ and that these evaluations will affect the 
way that offenders are treated by the system. However, as we will see below, it is 
possible to deny that implication; furthermore we will also see that there are 
important challenges that any provision for officials to make such evaluations 
would have to meet (Bagaric and Amarakesara 2001; Lippke 2008; Weisman 
2014). These challenges focus on whether officials have the competence to make 
such evaluations; whether subjecting individuals to such evaluations is counter-
productive, particularly in the coercive context of criminal justice; and whether, 
even if the evaluations were competently made and useful, the state and its 
officials would have the right to make such evaluations. Before we broach those 
questions, this section will place the role of remorse in the context of 
philosophies of criminal justice, while the following section will look at the 
nature of remorse as an emotion.  
 
Any answer to normative questions about the appropriate role of remorse in the ǯǮǯǤ
remorse is an excellent illustration of the dividing lines amongst normative 
theories of criminal justice (Murphy 1997). For instance, if one thinks that the ǡǯ
be limited to whether one sees its presence as good evidence of future 
desistance. If one thinks of the aim of criminal justice as rehabilitation, one may 
be interested in remorse as a sign of moral or social improvement. If one thinks 
of criminal justice as properly meting out retributive justice, one will be 
interested in remorse to the extent that one thinks that remorse can affect what ǯǤ
the communication of collective condemnation for the commission of acts that 
cannot be tolerated in decent society then one might see remorse as a sign that 
the message has been heard and understood. These all show ways in which 
                                                        
1 Or lay people co-ǢǮǡǯǯ
decisions are deemed to have to be responsive to public opinion. 
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remorse might be taken to be relevant, for instance, to determining the quantum 
of punishment appropriate for a particular offender, and hence might inform 
decisions about sentencing or parole. A similar point might be made about 
fitness to be tried and punished. If punishment is a matter of moral 
communication then only those who are capable of the relevant remorseful 
response would be apt for punishment. However, if punishment is for pure 
general deterrence then there may be no reason to think that the punishment of 
those who are incapable of remorse would be any less effective than the 
punishment of those who are so capable, and hence capacity for remorse would 
not set an important threshold for criminal responsibility.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate which conception of the 
general justifying aim of criminal justice is most adequate. However, it is worth 
briefly setting out some of the major fault lines in order better to illustrate why 
the relevance of remorse is a central dividing issue. Perhaps the major fault line 
is between forward- and backward-looking approaches; that is, between those 
who think that what justifies criminal justice is that it is the best available 
technique for bringing about some future good (normally, that good being 
security, or the settled avoidance of harm), and those who think that criminal 
justice is justified by the need to mark the seriousness of the wrong itself 
(independently of future good), in order to vindicate the rights and standards 
that were violated. Deterrence; incapacitation; many varieties of rehabilitation; ǣǮ-ǯǡ
means to a further end. If the criminal process Ȃ criminalizing actions, policing 
them, investigating them, trying apparent transgressors and punishing those 
convicted Ȃ were not the most cost-effective technique for bringing about 
security then, on a purely forward-looking view, there would be no reason to 
have such a process. By contrast some see the criminal process as something we 
need to have in order to do justice to the human significance of wrongdoing, 
independently of whether it brings about future security: amongst the 
supporters of this approach are retributivists, and some types of censure views, 
and some rehabilitationists.  
 
One thing that may appear to count in favor of the forward-looking approach is 
the apparent strangeness of a modern liberal state having an institution that is 
not directed at welfare or security Ȃ as there would be if the backward-looking ǤǮǡǡǫǯȂ seems like a fair and pointed 
rhetorical question. Healthcare, national defense, social security, public 
amenities: these are publicly funded services that each citizen needs in order to 
go about their business, no matter what that business is. By comparison, it might 
look as though the backward-looking view of criminal justice, which suggests 
that there should be a publicly-funded service that vindicates moral standards by 
punishing those who violate them, is at best a luxury and at worst a throwback to 
a pre-liberal age (Murphy 1985).  
 
However, a suggestive reply is available to the backward-looking camp, which 
brings us back to the relevance of remorse. The backward-looking view can 
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claim that its account of criminal justice humanizes what would otherwise be 
nothing more than a state-administered technique of social control. The 
backward-looking view models its approach to criminal justice on the reactions 
and interactions that play out in non-institutional interpersonal contexts of 
wrongdoing. Indeed, it can be seen as an attempt to capture such interpersonal 
interactions in institutional form. Remorse, like other reactions such as 
indignation, resentment, contempt, blame and so on, is a deeply-embedded 
feature of our interpersonal practices of accountability. These reactions are not 
things we engage in with the purpose of deterrence or incapacitation, etc.: 
rather, the most natural interpretation is that they are reactions that we have 
and express because we take them to be fitting given the nature of the wrong 
(Tasioulas 2007). When we expect an apology for wrongs done against us, for 
instance, it is not (just) because asking for an apology makes a secure future 
more likely, but rather because an apology is one of the thing one is owed when 
one has been let down, betrayed, or taken for granted. Furthermore, for an 
apology to be sincere Ȃ at least when it concerns serious wrongdoing Ȃ is 
normally for the person giving it to be moved by what they have done (Smith 
2005). The apology is an expression of remorse. But this suggests that, in 
interpersonal moral interactions, remorse plays a role other than its usefulness 
in predicting desistance. Rather what seems to underlie our interpersonal Ǯǯǡ
alienation and separation through remorse and amends to forgiveness, 
redemption and re-acceptance (Bennett 2008). Remorse plays a constitutive role 
in this process of repair since it marks the point at which it starts to matter to the 
person that they have unjustifiably caused harm. But if remorse, blame, 
indignation and so on are themselves backward-looking, and if there is some 
value in having an institution that embodies those interpersonal interactions Ȃ 
for instance, on the grounds that it thereby embodies an attractive view of 
political society as itself an interpersonal association Ȃ then it may be that there 
is reason to have, not only those institutions that promote welfare and security, ǯ
the values for which it stands.  
 
Some readers might be dissatisfied with the distinctions I have drawn here. They 
might be asking themselves whether it is not possible that both forward-looking 
and backward-looking considerations are important, and that a system might be 
better if it could realize both. Indeed they are, and indeed it would be. It seems 
undeniable that a form of criminal justice would be better the more it can 
accommodate both backward- and forward-looking considerations. That, on my 
understanding, is part of the promise of an alternative to conventional criminal 
justice such as restorative justice. Restorative justice can take various forms. But 
central to it seems to be an attempt to make room for an authentic interaction 
between the perpetrator and other affected parties, including the victim, in 
which a genuine apology might emerge (Van Ness and Strong 2010). As such we 
might say that the reasons for setting up a restorative justice programme are 
those we have identified as backward-looking. However, proponents of 
restorative justice have often defended it rather on the basis that it leads to 
lower recidivism rates and higher victim-satisfaction, and hence on the basis of 
forward-looking considerations. If correct, the conjunction of both leads us to see 
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why restorative justice might be a powerful way forward for criminal justice. 
Restorative justice might provide a way of dealing with crime that lowers crime 
rates and increases compliance but at the same time gives those affected by 
crime a meaningful and human vehicle through which to engage in contrition 
and forgiveness. 
 
4. Remorse As An Emotion 
Remorse is an emotion. But what sort of emotion is it, and how does this bear on 
its role in criminal justice? Broadly speaking emotions seem to be a cluster of 
various different elements. Firstly, there are bodily state elements such as 
agitation, raised heart rate, faster breathing, adrenaline, muscular tension, or 
their opposites. Secondly, there are distinctive phenomenal qualities of affect or 
feeling. Thirdly, there are belief- or perception-like elements involving some sort ǯȋǯǡǯ
situationǡǯding of the weal and woe of 
others). And fourthly, there are characteristic forms of behavior that a person in 
the grip of a particular emotion engages in. What ties these elements together 
may be said to be the causal links between them and their tendency to appear 
together as a syndrome. It is by reference to these elements that we individuate 
the emotions, explaining, for instance, in what ways indignation differs from 
anger, but also in what ways indignation is closer to anger than it is to jealousy, 
and so on.  
 
Very broadly speaking again, we find a continuum of theories of the emotions 
that emphasise one or more of these elements over the others. For instance, we 
have purely non-cognitive theories that see emotions as nothing more than 
feelings and bodily changes (James 1884); purely cognitive theories that see 
emotions as judgements (Nussbaum 2001); behaviourist theories that see 
emotions as nothing more than dispositions to behave in certain ways (Skinner 
1951); and a whole range of hybrid theories that try to explain how emotions 
can and do combine both cognitive and non-cognitive elements and others 
(Nussbaum and Kahan 1996). Partly cutting across this categorization, we have a 
distinction between those who see emotions as more or less automatic 
phyȋǮǯȌ
human psychology because of their strategic value to human organisms  (Frijda 
1986; Ekman 1992), and those who see emotions rather as social constructions 
that are dependent on culture, ideology and world-view (Averill 1992). On the Ǯ-ǯǡ
unconscious appraisal of the environment that cause the other features of 
emotions; whereas on the social constructionist view, it is socially-inculcated 
belief and understanding that causes the underlying physiology to be adapted to 
widely differing social meanings. 
 
It may be that none of these accounts is correct for all of the things we intuitively Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǢhowever, it may also be that what we call Ǯǯǡ
is better fitted to some emotions than others. For instance, it may be that the 
affect program view gives a plausible explanation of an emotion such as fear. On 
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a simple interpretation of this view, for instance, a person might perceive a tiger 
in the immediate vicinity, and the realization that the tiger is a threat could 
trigger a range of bodily changes, experienced as the feeling of fear, but which 
function to place the body in readiness for certain evolutionarily developed 
automatic reactions (which it is generally useful for a creature to have 
automatically, without having to think about them, when it is in such situations) 
of fight or flight. Fear is a good case for the affect program view because there is 
evidence of its automaticity and its cultural invariability. However, many 
theorists of the emotions concede that the affect program view cannot be 
straightforwardly applied to Ǯǯǡ
cultural influence is clearer (Griffiths 1997). For instance, if it is possible to have Ǯǯǡǡ
be a deep and authentic emotional response without it necessarily being the case 
that all human beings in all cultures are capable of having such a response.   
 
Where does remorse fit into all this? First of all, we can individuate remorse by 
reference to the various elements of emotions that we distinguished above: in 
particular the appraisals it involves and the behavior to which it leads (Proeve 
and Tudor 2010). Remorse is distinguished from emotions like fear and anger by 
virtue of being an emotion of (negative) self-assessment (Taylor 1984). For ǡǯǡ
the fear of what will happen to me as a result; or it might be anger that I will now 
have to pay for a replacement; but if it is remorse, my focus is rather on my own 
failure in some respect (for instance, my clumsiness, or negligence, or lack of due 
care, or the fact that I lashed out at the case in anger and so on). Remorse ǯǡ
standing in some dimension or other. It constitutively depends on how the 
person involved understands their action as reflecting on them in some way.  
 
We can elicit something of the specific character of the self-assessment involved 
in remorse if we contrast it with two other emotions of negative self-assessment, 
guilt and shame. Shame is conceived in the philosophical-psychological literature 
in two different ways: either as concerned with how one appears in front of 
others (as in the shame of being seen naked) (Sartre 1958); or as concerned with 
how one figures on a scale of excellence (as in the shame of having fallen short of ǯȌȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ	ǡǡǡǯer as a ǡǯǤ
ashamed of something, then, would involve either feeling that one was (nothing 
more than, or most importantly) an object of laughter or derision or contempt in 
the eyes of otheǡǯǤ
with shame can be covering oneself up, or hiding oneself away. Guilt, by contrast, 
is thought of as focused on a particular wrongful act, or sin, or transgression. The 
guilty person might see themselves as in some way stained or tarnished by their 
wrong, and might seek to expiate it, perhaps through penitential action. Remorse 
takes a different focus from either of these. While remorse is an emotion of self-
assessment, involving an acceptance of responsibility for the action, and a 
repudiation of it, its focus is not (simply) on oneself, nor (simply) on the ǯǡǤ
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The characteristic focus of remorse is the painful awareness of the harm one has 
inflicted on the other, and the way one has let them down (or worse) by causing 
it (Gaita 1991; Tudor 2000; Proeve and Tudor 2010).  
 
These distinctions are not simply conceptual categorization. Rather they indicate 
important potential pathologies that human beings can fall into in reacting to 
their own failures, and which can serve as distractions from what is most 
important. One such pathology is that one focuses too much, as shame does, on ǯ failure. Another pathology is that, as ǡǯǯ
duty. We can imagine someone berating herself for what she has done, or for the 
failure that she is, and thereby neglecting the victim. Distinguishing guilt and 
shame from remorse allows us to insist that, by contrast to these pathologies, the 
proper focus should be on the victim as the person who has been harmed.   
 
The differences among remorse, shame and guilt turn on how the person 
involved understands their situation Ȃ or, to put it better perhaps, what forms of 
understanding structure their experience of their situation. Remorse is a 
distinctive form of understanding of those acts that can be categorized as 
wrongdoing. Because of the level of cognitive elaboration required to make these 
distinctions between remorse and guilt and shame, it may be implausible that 
remorse is a basic emotion of the affect-program variety. Some form of emotional 
reaction to acts labeled socially as wrongs may be automatic and universal, as 
may some form of sympathy, compassion or fellow-feeling. But for the form of 
this reaction to have become, not simply fear or anger at the consequences, but a 
complex and elaborated feeling like remorse, requires a person to understand 
her situation in ways that, though she may find them compelling, are not merely 
instinctive. They have some grounding in her system of belief, her world-view, 
her wider outlook and set of attitudes. Hence the more plausible view might be 
that remorse is at least in part socially constructed. This is not to say that ǮǯǢ
that it feels real enough. And it is not to say that the appropriateness of remorse 
is morally arbitrary; perhaps the most adequate account of morality that we 
have available to us would hold that remorse is a necessary and appropriate 
response to wrongdoing. However, it is to introduce some flexibility. We perhaps 
cannot expect everyone to be capable of experiencing remorse simply by virtue of 
having the same basic biological-psychological inheritance as we have.  
 
If it is true that the social constructionist approach is a better model for an 
emotion like remorse, this would have repercussions for the relation between 
remorse and desistance. When a person is presented with situations that are a 
trigger for fear, we can expect that, absent a deficiency in their psychology and 
its underlying physiology, they will experience fear; and we would expect that 
fear would drive them to a pre-determined range of actions. If a capacity for 
remorse is culturally learned, however, we might find some people who, because 
of differences in socialization, have not developed that learned capacity, and yet 
who do not have any underlying physiological deficiency. Presented with 
situations that would trigger remorse in us, these people would remain 
unmoved, or would be moved in a different way. Perhaps Hyde might be such a 
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person, though not the only type. Furthermore, while fear brings on certain 
behavior automatically, it is at least possible that some people who have learned 
to experience remorse have only imperfectly learned to connect their remorse to 
certain kinds of victim-oriented reparative behavior. Such behavior is not simply, ǡǮǯǯǤǯ
as to be spontaneous and authentic; furthermore, reparative action is behavior 
that makes sense to the agent as fitting given the way he understands his 
situation from the point of view of his emotion. If one feels the crushing weight of 
remorse from having harmed something one values, or has come to value, it 
makes sense to seek to repair that thing in any way still possible. So there is a 
logic to reparative behavior, a connection with the emotion that it expresses, that ǮǯǤǡ
someone who has only imperfectly learned the behavior of remorse may only 
imperfectly see the connection; and if this is the case then it may be possible to 
have genuine feelings of contrition, and yet to fail to be motivated to make 
amends, or apologize, or desist, and so on. While the presence of fear is a good 
predictor of behavior, the presence of remorse may leave it unclear how it will 
issue in action. Added to our cautionary note, we should point out that the 
connection between episodes of remorse and desistance is likely to be yet more 
tenuous because desistance is not simply a one-off expression of an emotion but 
a life-change that requires many more things to be in place before it becomes a 
live option (Bagaric and Amarakesara 2001). 
 
This suggests that, if our concern with remorse is situated within a purely 
forward-looking crime-reduction picture, we would expect to find the presence 
of remorse a highly fallible predictor of desistance (Bandes 2016). By contrast, 
we can now see more clearly why the alternative, backward-looking approach 
should give remorse a central place. The reason remorseful apology is effective is 
that it expresses a deep-running understanding of the wrongness of the action: 
the apology repudiates and retracts the attitude expressed by the wrong. If we 
think that criminal justice is in some way based on the social rituals of censure, 
apology and re-acceptance, remorse is clearly pivotal: it is a form of moral 
understanding that criminal justice aims to endorse, communicate and 
strengthen. If we are persuaded by the social constructionist account of remorse 
then it will be true that, just as moral understanding is culturally learned and ǯǡǤ
However, it is not for that reason dispensable, or of only conditional importance. 
The centrality of remorse serves to humanize what can otherwise be a 
bureaucratic and repressive institution by asserting that its concern remains 
with the basic material of human moral behavior, its rights and wrongs, and its 
repair. 
 
5. Should Officials Have Powers To Evaluate Remorsefulness? 
The preceding two sections have shown that there are at least some reasons for 
the relevance of remorse to criminal justice, particularly if one agrees that 
criminal justice should seek to reflect aspects of our interpersonal practices of 
accountability, such as censure and apology. However, we now need to ask what 
the practical implications of this should be. Should the criminal justice system 
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expect remorse from offenders? And in particular, should officials have powers to 
evaluate remorsefulness, and to treat offenders differently depending on 
whether they are remorseful or not? 
 
A number of writers have defended the view that they should, arguing, for 
instance, that remorse should be a mitigating factor in sentencing (Tasioulas 
2004; Smith 2014; Maslen 2015). Proeve and Tudor put it this way: 
 Ǯǡ
of being subject to the criminal justice system and, in particular, being 
before a sentencing court is among the most serious and the most critical. 
To misrecognize an offender at this juncture can itself be a serious wrong 
to him. Where the offender is experiencing remorse, he is experiencing a 
significant shift in his self-perception and a reorientation toward himself. 
This makes the situation of the remorseful offender a potentially critical 
one in terms of the re-formation of (at least aspects of) his self-
conception. To fail to recognize the remorseful offender as a remorseful 
offender can thus amount to a basic misrecognition of him which 
disconfirms the value of his remorse, and so can constitute a significant 
wrong to him. To try to avoid that wrong of misrecognition, it will 
normally be the case that a reduction of sentence severitǯ
(Proeve and Tudor 2010, p. 130). 
 
The argument here is that remorsefulness involves a deep reorientation that 
should be acknowledged by officials and reflected in the way the offender is 
treated. The offender may justifiably feel overlooked if the justice system gives a 
central place to remorse, and he is now experiencing remorse, but that makes no 
difference to the sentence. However, although there is a prima facie case for 
treating remorse as mitigation, putting this into practice unavoidably involves 
giving officials power to evaluate remorsefulness. Furthermore, it is quite 
possible to think that the overarching purpose of criminal justice is shaped by 
the appropriateness of remorse without thereby thinking that the criminal 
justice system should aim to treat those showing and failing to show remorse 
differently (Bennett 2006, 2008). Those who think officials should be in the 
business of evaluating remorsefulness need to recognize that doing so would 
raise a number of problems (Lippke 2008). 
 Ǯǡǯǡ
intrusiveness and fairness of coercive rehabilitative treatment (Allen 1981). If 
criminal justice is to have a rehabilitative element, it needs ways of gauging 
rehabilitative progress: here remorse may be taken, in a commonsense way, as 
one predictor of future desistance. But, as might be asked of other forms of 
rehabilitative treatment, is there solid evidence that penal treatment leads to 
remorse, or that remorse is a good predictor of desistance? Does the expectation 
that offenders will feel remorse rest on unrealistic expectations about the extent 
to which human nature is malleable and oriented to the good? There are also 
concerns about intrusiveness. Does a focus on remorse resemble mind control, ǯǡ
 14 
particularly where it is coerced? And there are concerns about fairǤǯ
the inclusion of remorse in sentencing or parole decisions upset proportionality, 
most dramatically where sentences are open-ended and conditional on sufficient 
moral progress (von Hirsch 1976)? 
 
Jean Hampton, who herself defends a form of reǮǯǡǣ 
 Ǯ
repentance is, from the standpoint of this theorist, a grave and lamentable ǥe board uses the threat of refusal of parole to get the 
kind of behavior it wants from the criminal, and the criminal manipulates 
back Ȃ playing the game, acting reformed, just to get out. In the process, 
no moral message is conveyed to the criminal, and probably no real Ǥǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ ? ? ?-3) 
 ǯ
coercive framework of criminal punishment is self-defeating and makes it less 
likely that genuine remorse will emerge. Hampton argues that the moral ǮǯǢǯ
that the point of punishing people is to get them to see their actions as wrong, ǯ of that aim. In inflicting the ǡǮǡǤǯǯs a 
structuring role in the overarching purpose ascribed to criminal justice, but 
which rejects what might be taken as the natural implication of this view, that 
the system should therefore empower officials to make judgements on the 
quality of participants remorsefulness. 
 
A similar concern about coerced remorse has recently been expressed by 
Richard Weisman (Weisman 2014). Weisman presents the point in the context of 
a social constructionist account of remorse, and an analysis of its legal regulation 
as as a form of social control.  
 Ǯ
concealed threat of violence, judicial discourse shapes the content of 
remorse in a way that reflects the context in which it is produced. If it is 
appreciated that remorse is not just a psychological trait inherent in the 
individual but rather an attribute that is situated in a specific social 
context, the impact of juridical discourse on the shaping of remorse 
becomes all the more comprehensible. The form in which remorse must 
be expressed is that of submission to a greater power Ȃ the moral 
performances that are validated all have as their common point of 
reference a posture of abjection and surrender by the offender before the Ǥǯȋ 2014, p. 44) 
 Ǯǯǡ
shaped by social expectations; and that in the judicial system it is shaped both by 
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the coercive context of the threat of (prolonged) punishment, but also by the 
authority claimed in that coercive context by the state to pass judgement on 
what the defendant should feel remorse for and whether her remorse is Ǥǡǯǡǯ
fate depend on whether they can convincingly display the remorse expected of 
them, where it is legal officials themselves who have the final say on whether 
they do or not. This means that the remorse in this case is not simply directed 
towards the gravity of the offence, but cannot but be infected by the need to ǯǤ
expects participants to experience and display remorse, it must be on the ǯǤ 
 
A related challenge Ȃ which emerges once we acknowledge the role of social 
expectations in shaping remorse Ȃ is that cultural differences may influence 
evaluations of the appropriateness of remorse (Bandes 2016). For instance, 
different cultures may have different rules about who can display remorse, and 
how, and indeed what appropriate remorse looks like when it is displayed. We 
need to be open to the possibility that what may look like a lack of remorse to 
one observer may look different to someone attuned to the norms of the culture 
from which the person being observed comes. An expression of this concern in 
the US context is as follows: 
 ǮǯǡǲǯǤǳ
racial/ethnic minorities may prohibit such required displays of remorse, ǯ
a valid expression of remorse from a member of a different racial/ethnic Ǥǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ ? ? ?Ȍ 
 
Everett and Nienstedt bring out the dual aspect of the concern: that some 
individuals may be disadvantaged in a criminal justice context by cultural norms 
prohibiting reǡǯǮǯ
correctly. This concern becomes particularly acute in multicultural societies 
where a particular cultural group is already severely socially disadvantaged (in 
which case it is already likely that its culture of bodily expressions and display 
rules will be unfamiliar to mainstream society). 
 Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡǡg emotions 
such as remorse to be appropriate, but asking that they be demonstrated in 
public settings, on pain of suffering some disadvantage such as being convicted 
when one could have escaped it, or being denied parole, or losing mitigation at 
sentencing. This raises a problem of whether a requirement (not a formal 
requirement, but a strong incentive) to display remorse risks placing offenders 
in a humiliating position that threatens their integrity. Compulsory attitudinizing 
prevents a person from being able to behave authentically with respect to their 
profound convictions; by putting individuals in a position in which they will be 
seriously disadvantaged if they do not give a convincing show of remorse we 
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pressure people to display the emotions they think are expected of them even if ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
 
Hampton enters a final important reservation about empowering officials to ǤǮ
when it enacts law. It is not just possible but probable that the state at one time 
or another will declare a certain action immoral which some of its citizens will Ǥǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?Ȍ
criminal laws that are morally mistaken, it would be grotesque to disadvantage 
those defendants or convicted offenders who were unable or unwilling to show ǮǤǯ
would go for mistaken convictions, which again are inevitable. But if it is clearly 
inappropriate to evaluate for remorse in these cases, the concern might be that 
there is no principled way of instructing officials how to distinguish cases in 
which remorse is not to be expected and those in which it is. After all, from the 
point of view of the system, criminal laws are valid, and procedurally sound 
convictions determine how individuals are to be treated. The system has to make Ǥǯ
distinguish between cases in which the offender is not morally guilty, and should 
not be expected to display remorse, and those in which she is? In which case, 
given that it is grotesque to expect someone to display remorse when they are 
not morally guilty, and given that procedural correctness does not distinguish 
successfully between cases of moral guilt and innocence, should the system not 
refrain entirely from giving officials powers to make dispositive evaluations of 
remorsefulness? 
 
Of course, these objections are not the final word (Tasioulas 2007). Whether 
they can be answered will depend on what is the most adequate view of the 
extent and nature of individual rights of privacy and conscience, and of the limits 
of state authority. However, they do give us reason to investigate how to 
construct a system that, while it may acknowledge and embody the 
appropriateness of remorse, does not disadvantage those who may be unable to 
show it to the satisfaction of a designated observer. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Readers are now in a better position to return to the various roles remorse plays 
in the criminal justice system and to make a reasoned assessment of them. 
Having surveyed the places in which remorse is implicated in the criminal justice 
system, we noted that any assessment of these roles would have to be informed 
by some orientation to the more basic question of what criminal justice properly 
attempts to achieve. We distinguished forward- from backward-looking 
conceptions of the general justifying aim, and noted that the former might take 
an instrumental view of the proper role of remorse while the latter gives 
remorse inherent value as a fitting response within our interpersonal practices 
of accountability. We then looked at the theory of the emotions, noting that, Ǯǯ
generating a pre-determined pattern of behavior, remorse is likely to be best 
categorized as more cognitive and more socially constructed. This in turn 
suggested that remorse may be an unreliable predictor of desistance, even if it is 
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to be welcomed as a moral epiphany and an essential element of the social ritual 
of apology. We then asked what implications all of this has for whether remorse 
should play a role in the coercive mechanisms of state criminal justice. Theorists 
since Kant have worried that it is an inappropriate task for the state and its legal 
institutions to ask after the inner motivations of action, and that it should stick to 
the external regulation of behavior: justice, but not virtue (Kant 1996). Kant may 
have thought that it was simply impossible to know about character and virtue; 
others may be less skeptical on this front, but may find it intrusive or counter-
productive to make such inquiries nevertheless.  
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